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Abstract
Data collected in criminal investigations may suffer from issues like: (i) incompleteness, due
to the covert nature of criminal organizations; (ii) incorrectness, caused by either uninten-
tional data collection errors or intentional deception by criminals; (iii) inconsistency, when
the same information is collected into law enforcement databases multiple times, or in differ-
ent formats. In this paper we analyze nine real criminal networks of different nature (i.e.,
Mafia networks, criminal street gangs and terrorist organizations) in order to quantify the
impact of incomplete data, and to determine which network type is most affected by it. The
networks are firstly pruned using two specific methods: (i) random edge removal, simulating
the scenario in which the Law Enforcement Agencies fail to intercept some calls, or to spot
sporadic meetings among suspects; (ii) node removal, modeling the situation in which some
suspects cannot be intercepted or investigated. Finally we compute spectral distances (i.e.,
Adjacency, Laplacian and normalized Laplacian Spectral Distances) and matrix distances
(i.e., Root Euclidean Distance) between the complete and pruned networks, which we com-
pare using statistical analysis. Our investigation identifies two main features: first, the overall
understanding of the criminal networks remains high even with incomplete data on criminal
interactions (i.e., when 10% of edges are removed); second, removing even a small fraction
of suspects not investigated (i.e., 2% of nodes are removed) may lead to significant misinter-
pretation of the overall network.
Introduction
Criminal organizations can be defined as groups operating outside the boundaries of the law,
that profit from providing illicit goods and services in public demand in an illicit manner, and
for which achievements come at the detriment of other individuals, groups or societies [1].
Organized crime can be referred to by a range of different terms such as gangs [2], crews [3],
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firms [4], syndicates [4], or Mafia [5]. In particular, Mafia is defined in Gambetta’s work [6] as
a “territorially based criminal organization that attempts to govern territories and markets”
and he refers to the one located in Sicily as the original Mafia.
Whatever term is used to identify organized crime, the latter is anyway based on relational
traits. For this reason, scholars and practitioners are increasingly adopting a Social Network
Analysis (SNA) perspective to explore criminal phenomena [7]. SNA is indeed a powerful tool
to analyze criminal networks and to gain a deeper understanding of criminal behavior [8].
SNA algorithms are able to produce relevant measurements and parameters relevant to iden-
tify the roles and importance of individuals within criminal organizations [9] and to construct
crime prevention systems [10].
Over the last decades, SNA has been employed greatly by Law Enforcement Agencies
(LEAs). This increasing interest from law enforcement is due to the SNA ability to identify
mechanisms that are not easily discovered at a first glance [11].
SNA relies on real datasets used as sources which allow to build networks that are then
examined [10, 12–18]. However, the collection of complete network data describing the struc-
ture and activities of a criminal organization is difficult to obtain.
In a criminal investigation, the individuals subjected to LEAs enquiries may attempt to
shield sensible information. Investigators then have to rely on alternative methods and exercise
special investigative powers allowing them to gather evidence covertly. Information available
for analysis can then come from sources such as phone taps, surveillance, archives, informants,
interrogations to witnesses and suspects, infiltration in criminal groups. Despite significant
advantages, such sources may also come with a number of drawbacks.
During investigations, some of the individuals providing information might be reliable,
while others might attempt to deceive the investigations with the aim to protect themselves or
their associates, or to achieve a goal. For instance, if actors are aware of being phone-tapped,
they are more likely to avoid exposing some self-incriminating evidence. While transcripts of
discussions between unsuspecting actors may be considered more reliable, a double-check is
still needed between information collected from the taps and data collected from other official
records related to the case. This is required since conversations among criminals often involve
lies or codes concealing the true nature of the crime [19]. Moreover, if police misses surveil-
lance targets, central actors may not appear with their actual role in the data, simply because
their phones end up not being tapped [5].
While the police seeks to validate the content of phone-taps, the offenders themselves try to
find out whether the information received from fellow criminals is actually accurate. Longer
investigations and surveillance tend to eventually expose such lies. On the other side, with
investigations going on, the list of suspects may change over time, with the group, and conse-
quently data, changing significantly as a function of police decisions.
Police decisions may indeed impact the design of an investigation. LEAs normally start
with some central individuals and then expand their reach by adding further actors. Not all the
individuals linked to the central ones are automatically added, though. This can happen, for
instance, when there are not enough resources available to investigate all active criminal
groups, then prosecution services concentrate indeed on groups on which they can gather evi-
dence easily. This kind of decisions are more prone to the risk of some groups operating under
the police radar and then left out from the collected data. This approach is shown to hold
extremely high chances of generating distorted inferences about the network structure [20].
The problem of actors lying is extended to data collected through questionnaires or inter-
views as well. Information collected from interrogations may not be reliable, with the risk of
interviewees downplaying or amplifying their real role or not being representative of the
broader group.
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Incompleteness and incorrectness in criminal network data is then inevitable, since avail-
able intelligence data is determined more by the subjective judgements of investigators. This is
due to investigators dealing with different qualities of data and because there is no standard
methodology in SNA, for taking into account such degrees of reliability.
The problem of determining which information is relevant is usually referred to as the
problem of signal and noise, in which important information is mixed in with large amounts
of irrelevant, or unreliable information. LEAs are indeed often faced with the problem of hav-
ing too much data, some of which being of little value. With large volumes of raw data col-
lected from multiple sources, the risk of inconsistency becomes higher as well. Analytic
techniques used in intelligence then must be able to cope with large amounts of information,
and be capable to extract the signal from the noise.
In summary, data collected in criminal investigations often suffers from:
• Incompleteness, caused by the covert nature of such type of networks;
• Incorrectness, caused by either unintentional data collection errors and intentional deception
by criminals;
• Inconsistency, when records of the same actors may be collected into law enforcement
databases multiple times and not necessarily in a consistent way. Such misleading infor-
mation may lead to an actor featuring multiple times (as different individuals) in the
network.
Another problem specific to SNA for criminal networks lies in how data are transformed.
As stated before, data needs to be presented in a specific manner, with actors being represented
by nodes, whereas their associations or interactions are represented by links. In SNA, there is
not a standard method for such data transformation task from raw data: the process undergoes
the subjective judgement of the analyst that might be debatable. For instance, it may be diffi-
cult for an analyst to decide whom to include or exclude from the network, if its boundaries
are prone to ambiguity [21]. Data conversion then ends up being a fairly labor-intensive and
time-consuming task.
Finally, another feature of criminal networks is represented by their dynamics: such net-
works are not static, meaning that they constantly change over time. To represent such dynam-
ics, new data or even different data collection methods are required, for covering longer time
spans [21].
In this work, a network science approach is adopted to assess how much of the available
data of a criminal network may be missing, before it starts to be unreliable. In other words, our
aim is to quantify how much the partial knowledge of a criminal network can affect investiga-
tions in a significant way.
An interesting application of SNA consists of comparing networks, by finding and quanti-
fying similarities and differences between them [22–24]. Network comparison requires mea-
sures for the distance between graphs, a non-trivial task involving sets of features which are
often sensitive to the specific application domain. Some reviews on the most common graph
comparison metrics are [25–28]. In [29], such distance measures were exploited to quantify
how well artificial (but realistic) models can simulate real criminal networks. The same mea-
sures are used herein for a different task.
In this paper, we analyze nine real criminal networks of different nature, which are the
result of different investigative operations over Mafia networks, criminal street gangs and ter-
rorist organizations. To quantify the impact of incomplete data and to determine what kind of
network mostly suffers from it, we adopted the following strategy:
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1. We pruned input networks by means of two specific methods, namely: random edge
removal and random node removal, which reflect the most common scenarios of missing
data arising in investigation environments.
2. We calculated the distance between the original (and complete) network and its pruned
version.
Materials and methods
This section presents basic definitions and notations on graph theory concepts and the dis-
tance metrics used for comparing two graphs. We also describe the datasets used in our experi-
mental analysis, as well as the protocol followed to run our analysis.
Background
Graph properties. A network (or graph) G = hN, Ei consists of two finite sets N and E
[30]. The set N = {1, . . ., n} contains the nodes (or vertices, actors), and n is the size of the net-
work, while the set E� N × N contains the edges (or links, ties) between the nodes.
A network is called undirected if all its edges are bidirectional. If the edges are defined by
ordered pairs of nodes, then the network is called directed. If an edge (i, j) with i, j 2 N is
weighted, then a positive numerical weight wij is associated to it; the unweighted edges have
their weight set to the default value wij = 1.
Given an undirected network G, two nodes i, j 2 N are connected if there is a path from i to
j: here a path p is defined as a sequence of nodes i0, i1, . . ., ik such that each pair of consecutive
nodes is connected through an edge. The number of edges in a path p starting at node i and
ending at node j is called path length. While there may be several paths from the node i to the
node j, we are usually interested in the shortest paths (i.e., those with the least number of
edges), whose length defines the distance dij between i and j. Of course, in undirected networks
we have dij = dji.
A graph G is called connected if every pair of nodes in G is connected, and disconnected oth-
erwise. If a network is disconnected, then this can be partitioned into a collection of connected
subnetworks, called components.
Based on the number of edges m, a graph is called dense if m is of the same order of magni-
tude as n2, or sparse if m is of the same order of magnitude as n. The density δ of an undirected








that is the total number of edges over the maximum possible number of edges.
The degree ki of the node i represents the number of adjacent edges to it. For an integer 0�
k� n, nk is the number nodes of degree k, while the degree distribution pk is the probability
that a randomly selected node in the graph has degree k. For a graph of n nodes, the normal-
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The degree ki allows to compute the clustering coefficient Ci of a node i [31], which captures





where Li represents the number of links between the ki neighbors of node i. The average of Ci
over all nodes defined the average clustering coefficient hCii, measuring the probability that
two neighbors of a randomly selected node link to each other.
Given a pair of graphs, say G1 and G2, we are often interested in defining a measure of simi-
larity (or, equivalently, distance) between them. In what follows we review some methods one
can use to compute the distance of two graphs.
Spectral distances. Spectral distances allow to measure the structural similarity between
two graphs starting from their spectra. The spectrum of a graph is widely used to characterise
its properties and to extract information from its structure.
The most common matrix representations of a graph are the adjacency matrix A, the Lapla-
cian matrix L, and the normalized Laplacian L.
Given a graph G with n nodes, its adjacency matrix A is an n × n square matrix denoted by
A = (aij), with 1� i, j� n, where aij = 1 if there exists an edge joining nodes i and j, and aij = 0
otherwise.
For undirected graphs the adjacency matrix is symmetric, i.e., aij = aji.
The degree matrix D is a diagonal matrix where Dii = ki and Dij = 0 for i 6¼ j.
Dij ¼
( ki if i ¼ j
0 otherwise:
ð4Þ
The adjacency matrix and the degree matrix are used to compute the combinatorial Lapla-
cian matrix L, which is an n × n symmetric matrix defined as
L ¼ D   A: ð5Þ
The diagonal elements Lii of matrix L are then equal to the degree ki of the node i, while the
off-diagonal elements Lij are −1 if the node i is adjacent to j, and 0 otherwise. A normalized
version of the Laplacian matrix L is defined as
L ¼ D  12LD  12; ð6Þ













If the representation matrix is symmetric, its eigenvalues are real and they can be sorted.
The spectrum of a graph consists indeed of the set of the sorted eigenvalues of one of its repre-
sentation matrices. The sequence of eigenvalues may be ascending or descending depending
on the chosen matrix. The spectra derived from each representation matrix may reveal differ-
ent properties of the graph. The largest eigenvalue in modulus is called the spectral radius of
the graph. If l
A
k is the k
th eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix A, then the spectrum is given by
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k is the k
th eigenvalue of the Laplacian matrix L, such eigenvalues are considered in







� � � � � l
L
n: ð9Þ
The second smallest eigenvalue of the Laplacian matrix of a graph is called its algebraic con-
nectivity. Similarly, if we denote the kth eigenvalue of the normalized Laplacian matrix L as lLk ,







� � � � � l
L
n : ð10Þ
The spectral distance between two graphs is the euclidean distance between their spectra
[32]. Given two graphs G and G0 of size n, with their spectra respectively given by the set of
eigenvalues λi and l
0
i, their spectral distance, according to the chosen representation matrix, is











Based on the chosen representation matrix and consequently its spectrum, the most com-
mon spectral distances are the adjacency spectral distance dA, the Laplacian spectral distance
dL and the normalized Laplacian spectral distance dL.
If the two spectra are of different sizes, the smaller graph is brought to the same cardinality
of the other by adding zero values to its spectrum. In such case, only the first k� n eigenvalues
are compared. Given the definitions of spectra of the different matrices, the adjacency spectral
distance dA compares the largest k eigenvalues, while dL and dL compare the smallest k eigen-
values. This determines the scale at which the graphs are studied, since comparing the higher
eigenvalues allows to focus more on global features, while the other two allow to focus more
on local features.
Matrix distances. Another class of distances between graphs is the matrix distance [33]. A
matrix of pairwise distances dij between nodes on the single graph is constructed for each as
Mij ¼ dij: ð12Þ
While the most common distance d is the shortest path, other measures can also be used,
such as the effective graph resistance, or variations on random-walk distances. Such matrices
provide a signature of the graph characteristics and carry important structural information.
Matrices M are then compared using some norm or distance.
Given two graphs G and G0, having M and M0 as their respective matrices of pairwise dis-
tances, the matrix distance between the G and G0 is introduced as:
dðG;G0Þ ¼k M   M0 k; ð13Þ
where k.k is a norm to be chosen. If the matrix used is the adjacency matrix A, the resulting
distance is called edit distance.
The similarity measure used in this work is called DELTACON [34]. It is based on the root
euclidean distance drootED, also called Matsusita difference, between matrices S created from
the fast belief propagation method of measuring node affinities.
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When used instead of the Euclidean distance, drootED(G, G0) may even detect small changes
in the graphs. The fast belief propagation matrix S is defined as
S ¼ ½I þ ε2D   εA�  1; ð16Þ
where ε = 1/(1 + max1�i�n Dii) and it is assumed to be ε� 1, so that S can be rewritten in a
matrix power series as:
S � I þ εAþ ε2ðA2   DÞ þ . . . : ð17Þ
Fast belief propagation is an effective algorithm and it is designed to perceive both global
and local structures of the graph [34].
Criminal networks data sources
Our analysis focuses on nine real criminal networks of different nature (see Table 1). The first
six networks relate to three distinct Mafia operations, while the other three are linked to street
gangs and terrorist organizations.
The Montagna Operation was an investigation concluded in 2007 by the Public Prosecu-
tor’s Office of Messina (Sicily) focused on the Sicilian Mafia groups known as Mistretta and
Batanesi clans. Between 2003 and 2007 these families infiltrated several economic activities
including public works in the area, through a cartel of entrepreneurs close to the Sicilian






































PK Kidnappers Attacks locations [44]
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0255067.t001
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Mafia. The main data source is the pre-trial detention order issued by the Preliminary Investi-
gation Judge of Messina on March 14, 2007.
The order concerned a total of 52 suspects, all charged with the crime of participation in a
Mafia clan as well as other crimes such as theft, extortion or damaging followed by arson.
From the analysis of this legal document we built two weighted and undirected graphs: the
Meeting network (MN) with 101 nodes and 256 edges, and the Phone Calls (PC) network with
100 nodes and 124 edges (see Table 2). In both networks, nodes are suspected criminals and
edges represent meetings (MN), or recorded phone calls (PC). These original datasets have
been already studied in some of our previous works [10, 16–18, 29, 45] and they are available
on Zenodo [35].
The Infinito Operation was a large law enforcement operation against ‘Ndrangheta groups
(i.e., groups of the Calabrian Mafia) and Milan cosche (i.e., crime families or clans) concluded
by the courts of Milan and Reggio Calabria, Italian cities situated in Northern and Southern
Italy, respectively. The investigation started 2003 is still in progress. On July 5, 2010, the Pre-
liminary Investigations Judge of Milan issued a pre-trial detention order for 154 people, with
charges ranging from mafia-style association to arms trafficking, extortion and intimidation
for the awarding of contracts or electoral preferences. The dataset was extracted from this judi-
cial act and is available as a 2-mode matrix on the UCINET [46] website (Link: https://sites.
google.com/site/ucinetsoftware/datasets/covert-networks/ndranghetamafia2). The Infinito
Operation dataset was investigated by Calderoni and his co-authors in several works [36–40].
From the original 2-mode matrix, we constructed the weighted and undirected graph Summits
Network (SN) with 156 nodes and 1619 edges (Table 2). Nodes are suspected members of the
‘Ndrangheta criminal organization. Edges are summits (i.e., meetings whose purpose is to
make important decisions and/or affiliations, but also to solve internal problems and to estab-
lish roles and powers) taking place between 2007 and 2009. This network describes how many
summits any two suspects may have in common. Attendance at summits was registered by
police authorities through wiretapping and observations during this operation.
The Oversize Operation is an investigation lasting from 2000 to 2006, which targeted more
than 50 suspects of the Calabrian ‘Ndrangheta involved in international drug trafficking,
homicides, and robberies. The trial led to the conviction of the main suspects from 5 to 22
years of imprisonment between 2007-2009. Berlusconi et al. [41] studied three unweighted
and undirected networks extracted from three judicial documents corresponding to three
Table 2. Mafia networks properties.
Network MN PC SN WR AW JU
weights weighted weighted weighted unweighted unweighted unweighted
directionality undirected undirected undirected undirected undirected undirected
connectedness false false false false false false
no. of nodes n 101 100 156 182 182 182
no. of isolated nodes ni 0 0 5 0 36 93
no. of edges m 256 124 1619 247 189 113
no. of components |cc| 5 5 6 3 38 96
max avg. path length hdi for cc 3.309 3.378 2.361 3.999 4.426 3.722
max shortest path length d 7 7 5 8 9 7
density δ 0.051 0.025 0.134 0.015 0.011 0.007
avg. degree hki 5.07 2.48 20.76 2.71 2.08 1.24
max degree k 24 25 75 32 29 13
avg. clust. coeff. hCi 0.656 0.105 0.795 0.149 0.122 0.059
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0255067.t002
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different stages of the criminal proceedings (Table 2): wiretap records (WR), arrest warrant
(AW), and judgment (JU). Each of these networks has 182 nodes corresponding to the individ-
uals involved in illicit activities. The WR network has 247 edges which represent the wiretap
conversations transcribed by the police and considered relevant at first glance. The AW net-
work contains 189 edges which are meetings emerging from the physical surveillance. The JU
network has 113 edges which are wiretap conversations emerging from the trial and several
other sources of evidence, including wiretapping and audio surveillance. These datasets are
available as three 1-mode matrices on Figshare [42].
The Stockholm street gangs dataset was extracted from the National Swedish Police Intelli-
gence (NSPI), which collects and registers the information from different kinds of intelligence
sources to identify gang membership in Sweden. The organization investigated here is a Stock-
holm-based street gang localised in southern parts of Stockholm County, consisting of margin-
alised suburbs of the capital. All gang members are male with high levels of violence, thefts,
robbery and drug-related crimes. Rostami and Mondani [13] constructed the Surveillance
(SV) network (Table 3). It contains data from the General Surveillance Register (GSR) which
covers the period 1995–2010 and aims to facilitate access to the personal information revealed
in law enforcement activities needed in police operations. SV is a weighted network with 234
nodes that are gang members. Some of them were no longer part of the gang in the period cov-
ered by the data and have been included as isolated nodes. The link weight counts the number
of occurrence of a given edge. This dataset is available on Figshare [43].
Project Caviar [5] was a unique investigation against hashish and cocaine importers operat-
ing out of Montreal, Canada. The network was targeted between 1994 and 1996 by a tandem
investigation uniting the Montreal Police, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and other
national and regional law-enforcement agencies from England, Spain, Italy, Brazil, Paraguay,
and Colombia. In a 2-year period, 11 imported drug consignments were seized at different
moments and arrests only took place at the end of the investigation. The principal data sources
are the transcripts of electronically intercepted telephone conversations between suspects sub-
mitted as evidence during the trials of 22 individuals. Initially, 318 individuals were extracted
because of their appearance in the surveillance data. From this pool, 208 individuals were not
implicated in the trafficking operations. Most were simply named during the many transcripts
of conversations, but never detected. Others who were detected had no clear participatory role
within the network (e.g., family members or legitimate entrepreneurs). The final Caviar (CV)
Table 3. Street gangs and terrorist networks properties.
Network SV CV PK
weights weighted weighted weighted
directionality undirected undirected undirected
connectedness false true false
no. of nodes n 234 110 246
no. of isolated nodes ni 12 0 16
no. of edges m 315 205 2571
no. of components |cc| 13 1 26
max avg. path length hdi for cc 3.534 2.655 3.034
max shortest path length d 6 5 9
density δ 0.012 0.034 0.085
avg. degree hki 2.69 3.73 20.9
max degree k 34 60 78
avg. clustering coeff. hCi 0.15 0.335 0.753
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0255067.t003
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network was composed of 110 nodes. The 1-mode matrix with weighted and directed edges is
available on the UCINET [46] website. (Link: https://sites.google.com/site/ucinetsoftware/
datasets/covert-networks/caviar). From this matrix, we extracted an undirected and weighted
network with 110 nodes which are criminals and 205 edges which represent the communica-
tions exchanges between them (see Table 3). Weights are level of communication activity.
Philippines Kidnappers data refer to the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) [44], a violent non-state
actor operating in the Southern Philippines. In particular, this dataset is related to the Salast
movement that has been founded by Aburajak Janjalani, a native terrorist of the Southern Phil-
ippines in 1991. ASG is active in kidnapping and other kinds of terrorist attacks. The recon-
structed 2-mode matrix is available on UCINET [46] (Link: https://sites.google.com/site/
ucinetsoftware/datasets/covert-networks/philippinekidnappings). From the 2-mode matrix,
we constructed a weighted and undirected graph called Philippines Kidnappers (PK) (see
Table 3). The PK network has 246 nodes and 2571 edges. Nodes are terrorist kidnappers of the
ASG. Edges are the terrorist events they have attended. This network describes how many
events any two kidnappers have in common.
Useful information about Mafia, street gangs and terrorist networks is provided in Tables 2
and 3, including edges weight and directionality, connectedness, number of nodes including
isolated ones, number of edges, number of connected components, maximum average path
length for each connected component, maximum shortest path length, average degree, maxi-
mum degree and the average clustering coefficient. The CV network seems to be the only fully
connected network (i.e., |cc| = 1) and, for this reason, in all the considered networks we chose
to compute the average path length for the single components and then to show the maximum
value.
Then, we showed the degree distributions for each criminal network as a normalized histo-
gram (see Fig 1). MN, PC, WR, AW, JU, SV and CV have similar degree distributions in which
most nodes have a relatively small degree k with values around 0, 1 or 2, while a few nodes
have very large degree k and are connected to many other nodes. SN and PK are the only net-
works having different degree distributions compared to other criminal networks, as most of
their nodes have large degree k. In particular, we note that most nodes in PK are strongly con-
nected and have a degree k = 57.
SN, which derives from the Infinito operation, is a one-mode projection of the original
two-mode network in which are represented the meetings and the suspects attending them.
This implies that all suspects taking part in a meeting are assumed to be interacting with each
other, which could be somewhat artificial. In fact, in crowded meetings some participants may
have had a very limited (if any) interaction with other participants. In such case, assuming that
all participants interacted with each other may considerably overestimate the real number of
connections. However, it must be added that LEAs were only able to identify the participants
to meetings and not the full extent of their interactions. Similar consideration applies to PK
which was built based on the presence of the kidnappers in the same place of a terrorist event.
Here as well, the existence of an edge linking two terrorists does not necessarily imply that
they have interacted or worked together, despite being in the same place.
Design of experiments
In this section we give technical details on the design of the experiments conducted.
In the attempt of gaining a deeper understanding of criminal networks, in our previous
work [29] we used graph distances to compare randomly generated graphs and a real criminal
network. In the present paper, we have implemented distances, to understand the extent by
which a partial knowledge of a criminal network may negatively affect the investigations. Since
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we are trying to estimate differences based on the types/amount of data missing, we set up the
experiments based on two main strategies: random edge removal and node removal. The first
case simulates the scenario in which LEAs miss to intercept some calls or to spot sporadic
meetings among suspects (i.e., due to the delays in obtaining a warrant). In node removal, the
selected nodes are removed along with their incident edges, and afterwards they are reinserted
within the networks as isolated nodes. Indeed, the second case models the scenario in which
some suspects cannot be intercepted. For instance, if a criminal is known to be a boss but there
are not enough proofs to be investigated, then that criminal can be identified as an isolated
node with no incident edges. However, node removal is expected to have a greater impact than
simple edge removal, since removing a node implies the deletion of all its edges as well.
Note that for a better comparison among the networks, all the graphs have been considered
as unweighted (as AW and JU). Also, all the suspects showed as isolated nodes of the original
network have been excluded. In fact, our input parameter was the edge list of the graph, which
does not take into account nodes with no incident edges.
Fig 1. Degree distributions. The degree distribution pk provides the probability that a randomly selected node in each criminal network has degree k.
Same colors imply the networks belong to the same police investigation.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0255067.g001
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Algorithm 1 shows the pseudocode of our approach. The full code is available at https://
github.com/lcucav/criminal-nets/tree/master/missing_data. In order to obtain the subgraphs,
we started from the previously described datasets; then, we converted them into graphs (i.e.,
G) and, lastly, we pruned them (i.e., G0) according to a prefixed range of fractions with 0<
torem� 10%. We opted for the 10% because the criminal networks considered are small, as
they have less than 250 nodes. Afterwards, we have computed the spectral and matrix distances
between the original and the pruned graphs. Each edge removal process has been repeated a
fixed number of times (nrep = 100) and the results obtained have been averaged. Thus, the
averaged distances values hXi and their standard deviations σ have been computed.
Algorithm 1 Pseudocode for computing the distances
1: Parameter configuration: nrep, torem, and check
2: Read the dataset and convert it as graph G
3: if check = True then
4: Isolate torem of nodes
5: else
6: Remove torem of random edges
7: end if
8: Compute S(G)
9: Compute the matrices A(G), L(G), LðGÞ
10: for torem do
11: for nrep do
12: Create a pruned graph G0 and compute S0 (G0)




15: Compute hXi, σ 8 d(G, G0) 2 nrep
16: end for
Results
Here we present the results obtained from the network pruning experiments. The distance
analysis between the real and the pruned networks is reported starting from the random edge
removal approach (Fig 2), moving to the analysis on the networks after node pruning (Fig 3).
The plots show the distances between the original graphs and their pruned versions up to 10%
of edges (Fe) and nodes (Fn), respectively.
In both removal processes, dA displays a saturation effect that makes the results difficult to
be interpreted. Hence, this distance is not effective for highlighting the effects of missing data
on criminal networks. Furthermore, from this metric it might seem that the two pruned net-
works of PK and SN show a greater deviation from their original counterparts, but this is due
to the inner structure of this metric, which is highly influenced by the node degree. In fact, the
average degree of PK an SN (see Tables 2 and 3) is significantly higher (i.e., hki’21) than the
other networks herein studied (i.e., 1< hki<4); moreover, their different topology is also evi-
dent from their degree distribution (see Fig 1). This is the reason why these networks seem to
have a more significant detachment effect than others; however, they too suffer the saturation
effect mentioned above as they grow. A similar behavior has also been encountered in dL and
its explanation is the same.
On the other hand, the distance metric which more effectively catches the damage caused
by a significant amount of missing data is dL, where distance growth is linear. Indeed, the
effects of hki are smaller as this aspect is compressed by the structure of this distance metric. It
would seem that this metric is the most effective measure compared to other spectral distances,
in understanding how much lacking data affects the total knowledge of the network. A similar
trend was also found in drootED; however, for a better comparison between node and edge
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removal processes, we analyzed in more detail this last metric by considering the DELTACON
similarity simDC (Fig 4).
The figure shows the difference between the original and pruned networks as the fraction
of elements removed increases (i.e., Fe for edges and Fn for nodes).
Before pruning the networks we have simDC = 1. Afterwards, the drop begins to became
more evident as the fraction F increases. In addition, as expected, the node removal process
affects more significantly the networks. This means that if the lack of data relates to sporadi-
cally missed wiretaps, or to just a few random connections between suspects, then the network
Fig 2. Edge removal effect. The removal effects of a fraction Fe of edges by showing the graph distances between the original graphs with their pruned
versions. (A) Adjacency Spectral Distance dA. (B) Laplacian Spectral Distance dL. (C) Normalized Laplacian Spectral Distance dL. (D) Root Euclidean
Distance drootED.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0255067.g002
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structure is not as much misinterpreted as if the case when one suspect has not been tracked at
all. Indeed, pruning the network by 2%, causes a simDC� 0.8 for edge pruning, compared to a
simDC’ 0.2 for the nodes ones. Therefore, even when a small amount of suspects are not
included in the investigations, this can lead to a very different network. The exclusion of the
suspects could be voluntary or not. It highly depends on the overall investigation process, start-
ing from the very preliminary analysis, and up to the judges’ decision to allow warrants, or to
exclude data considered irrelevant for the current investigation.
Fig 3. Node removal effect. The removal effects of a fraction Fn of nodes by showing the graph distances between the original graphs with their pruned
versions. (A) Adjacency Spectral Distance dA. (B) Laplacian Spectral Distance dL. (C) Normalized Laplacian Spectral Distance dL. (D) Root Euclidean
Distance drootED.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0255067.g003
PLOS ONE Criminal networks analysis in missing data scenarios
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0255067 August 11, 2021 14 / 18
Discussion
In this paper we analyzed nine datasets of real criminal networks extracted from six police
operations to investigate the effects of missing data. More specifically, three datasets regard
Mafia operations (i.e., Montagna, Infinito, and Oversize), and the remaining ones refer to
other criminal networks, including street gangs, drug traffics, or terrorist networks (i.e., Stock-
holm street gangs, Caviar Project, Philippines Kidnappers).
Our study focused on a careful analysis of the datasets, in order to simulate the events
where some data are missing. In particular, two different scenarios have been considered: (i)
random edge removal, simulating the case in which LEAs miss to intercept some calls or to
spot sporadic meetings among suspects; and (ii) node removal, for the scenario where certain
suspects cannot be intercepted for some reason. For instance, if a criminal is known to be a
boss, but there are not enough proofs for him or her to be investigated, then this can be identi-
fied by an isolated node with no incident edges.
To quantify the difference between the original criminal networks and their pruned coun-
terparts, several distance metrics have been considered. We computed the Adjacency, Lapla-
cian, and normalized Laplacian Spectral distances (i.e., dA, dL, and dL, respectively) plus the
Root Euclidean Distance (i.e., drootED), as this metric allows to compute the DELTACON similar-
ity (i,e., simDC), which can quantify even small differences between two graphs in the interval
[0, 1]. The pruning process involved removing a fraction of up to 10% of edges and nodes.
This percentage has been chosen as the networks size was quite small (less than 250 nodes per
each dataset).
Our analysis suggests that (i) the spectral metric dL is best at catching the expected linear
growth of differences with the incomplete graph against its complete counterpart; (ii) the node
removal process is significantly more damaging than random edge removal; thus, it translates
to a negligible error in terms of graph analysis when, for example, some wiretaps are missing.
Fig 4. DeltaCon similarity simDC computation. (A) Edge removal process by the fraction Fe. (B) Node removal process by the fraction Fn.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0255067.g004
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Indeed, in terms of simDC drop, there is a 30% difference from the real network, for a pruned
version at 10%. On the other hand, it is crucial to be able to investigate the suspects in a timely
fashion, since any exclusion of suspects from an investigation may lead to significant errors
(due to substantial differences from the actual network)—we observed drops of up to 80% of
simDC on some networks.
A final consideration concerns the impossibility of conducting this type of analysis through
the use of Machine Learning, as it is currently practically impossible to obtain a sufficient
number of reliable and complete datasets of real criminal networks as to be able to conduct an
appropriate training of a Neural Network.
For the future, we plan to extend the analysis by considering weights as well. This will allow
to conduct a comparative analysis of the missing data effects when not only the connections
between nodes, but also their frequency is known. Another interesting aspect to be considered
is the network behaviour after their pruning in both criminal and general social networks.
Lastly, using the future knowledge gained from the network analysis herein presented, one
could try to define an artificial network able to accurately simulate the behavior of real crimi-
nal networks.
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